A Hardware Security Solution against Scan-Based Attacks by Mehta, Ankit
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
2016 
A Hardware Security Solution against Scan-Based Attacks 
Ankit Mehta 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Mehta, Ankit, "A Hardware Security Solution against Scan-Based Attacks" (2016). Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations. 8002. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/8002 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. 
 
 





A Thesis  
 
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
through the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Applied Science 




Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
2016 
 
© 2016 Ankit Mehta 




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor,  MI 48106 - 1346
ProQuest         
Published by ProQuest LLC (    ).  Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.












Dr. Ahmed Azab  
Mechanical, Automotive & Materials Engineering 
 
______________________________________________ 
Dr. Huapeng Wu 
Electrical and Computer Engineering 
 
______________________________________________ 
Dr. Rashid Rashidzadeh, Supervisor 





Dr. Majid Ahmadi, Supervisor 







DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP/PREVIOUS PUBLICATION 
I. Co-Authorship Declaration 
I hereby certify that this thesis incorporates the outcome of joint research in collaboration with, and 
under the esteemed supervision of Dr. Rashid Rashidzadeh and Dr. Majid Ahmadi. 
I am aware of the University of Windsor Senate Policy on Authorship and I certify that I have 
properly acknowledged the contribution of other researchers to my thesis, and have obtained written 
permission from each co-author(s) to include the above material(s) in my thesis. I certify that, with the 
above qualification, this thesis, and the research to which it refers is the product of my own original work. 
II. Declaration of Previous Publication 
This thesis includes 3 original papers that have been previously published /submitted for publication in 
peer reviewed journals as follows: 
          Thesis Chapter 
 
       Publication Title/ full citation 
 






Title: “ A Hardware Security Solution 
against Scan based attacks”, 2016, IEEE 
Int’l Symposium on Circuits and Systems 
 
 
 Accepted  





Title: “ A Secure Test solution for Sensor 




           All Chapters 
 
 
Title: “A hardware secure solution for scan 
enabled circuits using access control” 
  Submitted 
 
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone’s 
copyright, nor violate any proprietary rights. Any ideas, techniques, quotations, and material 
appertaining to other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged 
in accordance with standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included 
copyrighted material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada 
Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to 
include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such copyright clearances in my 
appendix.  
I certify that I have obtained written permission from the copyright owner(s) to include the 
above published materials in my thesis. I certify that the above material describes work completed 
during my registration as graduate student at the University of Windsor.  
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved by 
my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been submitted 







Scan based Design for Test (DfT) schemes have been widely used to achieve high fault coverage 
for integrated circuits. The scan technique provides full access to the internal nodes of the device-
under-test to control them or observe their response to input test vectors. While such 
comprehensive access is highly desirable for testing, it is not acceptable for secure chips as it is 
subject to exploitation by various attacks. In this work, new methods are presented to protect the 
security of critical information against scan-based attacks. In the proposed methods, access to the 
circuit containing secret information via the scan chain has been severely limited in order to reduce 
the risk of a security breach. To ensure the testability of the circuit, a built-in self-test which utilizes 
an LFSR as the test pattern generator (TPG) is proposed. The proposed schemes can be used as a 
countermeasure against side channel attacks with a low area overhead as compared to the existing 
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                                                          Introduction and Background       
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement 
The need to increase the processing power and speed of processors, on the other hand reducing the 
price and power consumption of processors has led to decrease in the feature size of the transistors, 
This, in turn, has directly affected the operating clock frequency of microprocessors. For example, 
the operating frequency of current microprocessors is in the gigahertz range as compared to a few 
100 KHz in the 1970s. The reductions in feature sizes and the increased number of transistors per 
chip raises the probability that an IC may have manufacturing or functional defects. With feature 
sizes at the nanometer scale, it is not unusual that some of the transistors in the microchip may not 
work properly, and thus, causing the entire chip to malfunction [1].  
Defects created at the manufacturing stage are unavoidable even if the utmost care is taken in state 
of the art fabrication facilities. A popular rule of ten, which is followed in industry which states 
that the cost of testing goes up as we move from wafer to chip and from chip to board level and 
before it can be adopted for the system level use as shown in figure 1. Due to impossibility of 
infallible design and fabrication processes involved, it is imperative to screen out faulty ICs and 
defective parts so as to prevent the shipping of defective parts to customers. Testing techniques 
have been developed without considering the fact that the circuit added to increase testability can 
also be used to access security sensitive information. Many systems have been attacked using the 




In this thesis, we have proposed a secure design for test techniques to counter the scan based 
attacks. 
1. In the first technique, two modes for testing have been proposed, namely, the secure mode 
of testing and the insecure mode of testing. A controller is designed to control the transition 
from the secure mode to the insecure mode of testing and vice versa. 
2. In the second technique, a secure self-test technique has been proposed keeping in view the 
various stages of testing once the integrated circuit has been launched to the market. 
 
 
Figure 1: Various stages of Testing [90] 
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1.2 Testing of Digital Circuits 
 
Figure 2 shows the flow of testing for the digital circuits. For a given device under test, the binary 
test patterns are applied as the input to the circuit. The respective output responses are then 
obtained. These output responses are then compared with the correct stored responses in a response 
analyzer. If the responses match, then the circuit is considered to be acceptable, else the circuit is 
faulty. Most of the input test vectors are applied by an apparatus called ATE (Automatic Test 
Equipment) [2].The test responses are written and stored in the memory of the test equipment. 
1.3 VLSI Testing Challenges                                                                                                                         
The manufacturing of VLSI devices is a complex and cumbersome process. Figure 3 shows the 
image of a manufactured IC in which the channel length is 120 nm and there are six levels of 
interconnections and wirings. There are many stages in the IC manufacturing process.  In this 
particular process, some random manufacturing imperfections can cause variations in the process,  
 


















voltage and temperature in the final manufactured IC. Variations affecting transistor channel 
length, the metal interconnect width and thickness, and dielectric thickness can be grouped under 
process variations [11-13]. 
1.4 Types of Testing 
Testing methodology changes depending on the production stage at which an IC being tested. In 
the initial stage of production, for instance, after the wafers have been manufactured, wafer sort 
testing is performed. The motive to test at this stage is to sort out the faulty wafers [3, 4]. The 
remaining wafers which are deemed to be satisfactory are then processed to the next stage for 
packaging. While the sorting of wafers is performed, the characterization test is also conducted. 
Broadly, the test can be classified as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3: CMOS chip by IBM incorporating 6 levels of interconnections [7] 
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1. Functional Tests: In these type of tests, the input test vectors are applied and then the 
responses are compared. The motive is to check the correct functionality of the device 
under test. Many manufacturing faults (stuck at faults) are covered by this technique of 
testing.  
2. Parametric Tests: This type of testing can be categorized as a DC parametric test and an 
AC parametric test. The former consists of an open test, a short test, a leakage test and a 
threshold test whereas the latter entails refresh and pause time tests, rise and fall time tests, 
a speed test, and setup and hold tests. The test standards which have been designed do not 
depend upon the technology node being tested and hence, are independent of the 
technology being tested.  
3. Structural Tests: In this approach, the circuit under test is mainly tested by fault models 
based on the knowledge of the structural information of the device under test. Adopting 
structural testing can save time and increase the test efficiency significantly. Any specific 
fault model adopted in the structural testing does not guarantee the detection of all the 
possible faults in the circuits but can be quantified by the term fault coverage. 
At this point, it is important to highlight the notable differences involved in the testing of ICs and 
memory. The test methodology for memories fall in the paradigm of functional testing, which is 
designed to cover attributes such as address decoder speed, cell coupling, data sensitivity, write 
operation, and address uniqueness. To achieve extensive fault coverage, it demands long test 
vector sequences.  
Chip level testing and board level testing have many differences. In board level testing, the 
components are previously tested and embedded. One of the aims in board level testing is to check 
the contacts and wires used in the routing [5-6].  
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1.5 Test Dynamics and Fault models 
A fault in a manufactured IC can be defined as a defect which results due to a physical condition 
which prevents the circuit from performing in the desired manner. A Failure can be termed as a 
deviation from the expected performance of an IC; it expresses a need for repair so as to obtain the 
intended device output. A circuit error can be defined as the wrong output signal from the 
defective circuit. Fault models are used to generate and compare the test vectors for the device 
under test. When modeling a fault model, it is important to consider the following points: 
1. The fault model should be efficient in terms of the number of test patterns and test vector 
generation. 
2. The fault model must be capable of predicting the behavior of the circuit under test. 
The fault model can be divided into two categories, namely, the single fault model and the multiple 
fault model. The single fault model can be described as  
                                        Number of single faults = 𝑘 × 𝑛                                                      (1) 
where k signifies the type of faults and n signifies the possible fault sites which can be present  in 
the digital circuit. However, in the practical scenario, there are commonly multiple faults in the 
device-under-test and is given by  
                                Number of multiple faults=(𝑘 + 1)𝑛 − 1                                                     (2) 
As shown in the equation 2 the circuit can have the 𝑘 possible faults. The “-1” term represents the 
fault free circuit. In the single fault model two or more faults can result in the same faulty behaviors 
for all the patterns .However, these faults can be termed as equivalent faults. Under this 
assumption the total number of vectors to be actually considered for the given circuit are much 
less than  𝑘 × 𝑛 . This reduction in which the redundant faults are removed by the overlapping test 
7 
 
vectors is termed as fault-collapsing. By following the fault collapsing algorithms, fault simulation 
times and the test time for circuits with large value of n are reduced [8-10]. 
1.6 Hardware Attacks and Problem Statement 
Over many years, test interfaces have been built to test digital circuits. It was not known that the 
interfaces for testing could pose a security threat to the device under test. Many systems have been 
attacked using the controllability and observability provided by the advanced test techniques 
developed over past decades. To some level, the designer can prevent the system from being 
hacked by these DfT techniques and thus, can eventually reduce the system exploitation by 
applying various defenses. There is a strong need for the protection of crypto chips and the 
prevention of misuse of intellectual property without the inventor’s knowledge. This thesis focuses 
upon the protection of hardware from scan based attacks and three solutions have been proposed 
for different scenarios of testing.  
1.7 Thesis Contribution 
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 novel secure design for test techniques have been proposed for digital circuits; 
 the area overhead for the proposed secure test techniques are negligible ; and  
  the proposed secure techniques do not compromise the fault coverage which many 
existing techniques do.  
1.8 Thesis Organization  
The thesis contains a total of 7 chapters. In chapter 1, the introduction motivation and testing 
challenges is discussed and hardware security is discussed. In Chapter 2 various test techniques 
are discussed. Chapter 3 discusses about IEEE 1149.1 and P1500 standard. In chapters 4 to 6 secure 





                              Testing of VLSI Circuits and Design for Testability                                                                 
2.1 Introduction 
Design for test techniques are used in integrated circuits to make the design testable while reducing 
the cost of testing. To physically realize the design for test techniques, extra hardware is usually 
required; this extra hardware is realized in the form of logic gates which are directly connected to 
the internal logic or the core logic to be tested. The advantages of using the DfT techniques include:  
(a) increased fault coverage; (b) making the circuit easier to control and observe; (c) reduced 
testing time; and (d) supporting the hierarchical testing for logic. 
The product quality of integrated circuits is quantified by various terms such as Defect, Yield and 
Defect Level. A defect can be defined as a fabrication problem caused by the manufacturing 
process. The defect on the wafer can be caused by process variation the impurities in wafer material 
and chemicals, dust particles in the projection system, or mask misalignment. Yield is defined as 
the fraction or the percentage of good chips produced in the system out of the total chips produced 
in a batch of manufacturing chips. Defect level is the metric which is used to characterize the 
effectiveness of the test type and the manufactured product quality achieved. It is the ratio of the 
faulty chips to the chips which have passed the tests. The unit used to measure the defect level is 
parts per million (ppm). 
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2.2   Built in Self-Test 
 
Figure 4 shows a typical setup for built in self-test (BIST), which consists of a test pattern generator 
(TPG) for generating the test patterns, circuit under test (CUT) which needs to be tested, and a 
response analyzer which analyzes the response obtained from the circuit under test and compares 
it with the golden signature. For controlling all the operations of BIST, there is a BIST controller 
which is responsible for switching between the various states. Using BIST is advantageous as; it 
eliminates the need for the external tester, supports at speed testing which helps to detect delay 
faults, and it also helps to reduce test time and tester memory requirements. One of the problems 
associated with built-in self-test as a method of testing is that the BIST should be able to deal with 
the unknown values X [8-9]. 
2.3 Test Pattern Generation 
The most commonly used test pattern generators for BIST applications are linear feedback shift 
registers (LFSRs) which are also used for exhaustive testing, pseudo exhaustive testing, and 
pseudo random testing. To achieve full fault coverage and have the multiple stuck at fault 
 




coverage, exhaustive testing is used. The various possible configurations of LFSR are discussed 
in the proceeding sections. [15]. 
2.3.1 Standard LFSR 
Figure 5 shows the configuration of the conventional LFSR. It is made up of n D-flip flops and 
exclusive-OR (XOR) gates. When the XOR gates are placed on the external feedback path, it is 
called external-XOR LFSR [14].  
2.3.2 Modular LFSR 
Figure 6 shows the modular type n stage internal feedback type LFSR with the feedback 
connections in the internal type. The speed of the modular LFSR is faster as compared to the 
conventional LFSR. This is due to the fact that in the conventional type configuration, each XOR 
gate introduces a gate delay [14].  
 
 
Figure 5: The n-stage conventional LFSR [10] 
 
Figure 6: The n stage modular LFSR [10] 
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2.4 LFSR Characteristics 
 
Figure 7 shows the difference in the sequence of the test patterns which is generated by the 
different types of LFSR as discussed above; it is assumed that the initial contents of both types of 
LFSR are set to {0001}. It is clear from the figure that for the type “a” LFSR, the sequence repeats 
after 6 cycles whereas for the type “b” LFSR, the sequence repeats after 10 clock cycles [16]. The 
polynomials which describe the above sequences can be described by 1+x2+x4 and 1+x+x4, 
respectively. Many solutions exploiting the use of LFSR have been proposed using the advanced 
design for test techniques such as broadcast scan method, variable linear decompressors, and 
Illinois scan architecture [10]. 
 
Figure 7: Test pattern generated by different LFSR [10] 
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2.5 Mathematical Modelling of LFSRs 
The various possible forms of LFSRs are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6;each has Sn flip flops, n 
feedback paths, and is defined by the feedback coefficient hn. The feedback coefficient defines 
whether the feedback path is active or not. 
 If hi = 1, the feedback path is closed or active.  
 If hi = 0, the feedback path is open or inactive , 
The value of the output of the flip-flop is multiplied by its coefficient pi; the result of the 
multiplication depends upon whether the value of hi is 1 or 0.To begin, we can assume that the 
initial value stored in the flip flops is si0, si1,…..sin-1 and the feedback connections can be defined 
as h1, h2,…… hn-1.The output can be defined as sm. 
                                     𝑠𝑚 ≡ 𝑠𝑖0ℎ𝑛−1 + ⋯ + 𝑠𝑖−2ℎ2 + 𝑠𝑖−1ℎ0 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2            
Following this, the next stage of the LFSR is defined as  
 
                        𝑠𝑚+1 ≡ 𝑠𝑖1ℎ𝑛−1 + ⋯ + 𝑠𝑖−1ℎ2 + 𝑠𝑖ℎ0 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2                 
 
The general equation expressing the output of the LFSR can be defined as follows  
 
                 𝑠𝑖+𝑚 ≡ ∑ 𝑠𝑖 ∙ ℎ𝑖+𝑗
𝑚−1
𝑗=0 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2     ; 𝑠𝑖  , ℎ𝑗 ∈ {0, 1}  , 𝑖 = 0,1,2. . ..                                       (3) 
2.5.1 Attacks against the LFSR  
The inputs and the outputs from the LFSR are governed by a linear relationship. The advantage of 
this linear relationship is used in communication systems. On the other hand, as a cryptosystem, 
this opens opportunities for attackers. In this section, the linear relationship of the LFSR is studied 
and possible attacks are also discussed. To attack an LFSR, it is assumed that the position of 
feedback switches is the secret key of the system (hm-1,…., h1, h0). It is also assumed that the 
13 
 
attacker knows some bits of the plaintext and the cipher-text, as well as the knowledge of the 
degree of the polynomial form the periodicity of the LFSR polynomial. The bits of the plaintext 
can be described as p0, p1…..  p2m-1 and the cipher-text bits can be written as c0, c1,…..c2m-1.With 
the known cipher-text and plain-text bits, the attacker can construct the 2m bits  
                                                        𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖  𝑚𝑜𝑑 2;    𝑖 = 0,1,2 … .2𝑚 − 1                                                        (4) 
To attack the LFSR, it is imperative to know the feedback coefficients hi and the stream of the 
input bits as defined by Equation 3.With the above knowledge, the attacker can generate the “m” 
equations for “m” values with different values of “i” as shown by the set of equations below.  
 
 𝑖 = 0, 𝑠𝑚 ≡ 𝑠𝑖0ℎ𝑛−1 + ⋯ + 𝑠𝑖−2ℎ2 + 𝑠𝑖−1ℎ0    𝑚𝑜𝑑 2      
𝑖 = 1,       𝑠𝑚+1 ≡ 𝑠𝑖1ℎ𝑛−1 + ⋯ + 𝑠𝑖−1ℎ2 + 𝑠𝑖ℎ0      𝑚𝑜𝑑 2    
                                 :                                    ∶                                         ∶ 
    ∶                                    ∶                                         ∶ 
 
      𝑖 = 𝑚 − 1, 𝑠2𝑚−1 ≡ 𝑠𝑖0ℎ𝑛−1 + ⋯ + 𝑠𝑖−2ℎ2 + 𝑠𝑖−1ℎ0      𝑚𝑜𝑑 2   
 
Thus by solving above linear equations with “m” unknowns the attacker can easily find out the 
feedback coefficients h0, h1,……, hm-1 by applying matrix inversion technique and Gaussian 
elimination algorithm, once the feedback coefficients are found the attacker can build the LFSR 
and obtain the output sequence 
2.6 Cyclic LFSRs 
To reduce the length of the test data, cyclic LFSRs can also be used for test generation. For cyclic 
LFSR, first, the (n, k) have to be defined for n-stage LFSR, and with periodicity of 2k-1. The cyclic 
14 
 
LFSRs are generated from the cyclic codes over the GF (2) which contains the 2k different code-
words and the n-bit tuple is realized by rotating the code-word bits to the right. The minimum 
code-word or weight of cyclic LFSR is defined by “d” in cyclic LFSR [17-18]. 
 
To generate the test patterns from the cyclic LFSR, the following steps have to be followed [18]: 
1. The generator polynomial g(x) has to be of greatest degree k’  (or the smallest degree k ) 
for generating (n’, k’)=(n’, n’-k) cyclic code that divides the 1+xn  and has the distance 
(design) of d ≥ w+1 [10]; and 
2. The equation h(x) = (1+xn)/g(x) can be used to generate the (n’, k) cyclic code which is the 
dual code of (n’, n’-k) and is generated from g(x).To construct the (n’, k) cyclic LFSR, the 
following equation can be used: 
                           𝑓(𝑥) = ℎ(𝑥)𝑝(𝑥) =
(1+𝑥𝑛)𝑝(𝑥)
𝑔(𝑥)
   
 
Table 1: Table showing the generator polynomial for cyclic LFSR [10] 
15 
 
where h(x) is the parity check polynomial of g(x) which satisfies the equation g(x)*h(x) = 1+xn’.  
 Shortening of the equation (n’, k) cyclic LFSR to (n, k) cyclic LFSR can be achieved by deleting 
the rightmost, middle or the leftmost n’-n stages from the (n’, k) cyclic LFSR which also yields the 
lowest area overhead [19]. 
2.7 Exhaustive Testing  
In exhaustive testing, the total number of 2n test patterns are applied to the circuit under test. 
Generally, exhaustive testing is not preferred for combinational circuits with a large number of 
inputs “n” as it takes a long time to cover all the states. A binary counter can even be used as the 
exhaustive pattern generator (EPG),  but the maximal length LFSRs are more efficient as compared 
to the binary counters; hence, they are generally used to  cover all the 2n -1 states. A right seeding 
is necessary for the LFSR to generate the right test patterns [20]. A right seeding is necessary to 
cover all the zero states in the test patterns of LFSR. The LFSR containing these zero states is 
called the complete LFSR (CFSRs) [21]. The techniques which can be used as the pattern generator 
satisfying the criteria of exhaustive testing are discussed in the proceeding sections. 
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2.7.1 Complete LFSR     
 
Figure 8 (a) and 8 (b) show the application of complete LFSRs for testing a 4-input circuit under 
test. The 4-stage LFSR has a period of 16 cycles. At the last stage of the complete LFSR, an XOR 
gate and a NOR gate take the input from (n-1 stages) and act as a zero-detector. Using this scheme 
is advantageous as it can achieve the zero state for each bit after the state of {0001}. The LFSR 
presented in (a) and (b) can be minimized as shown in Figure 8 (c) and (d). The realizations shown 
in (c) and (d) have the zero state after the sequence of {1000}. The advantage of using exhaustive 
testing is that the detectable faults in the combinational logic will be detected. Furthermore, when 
the number of inputs are small, exhaustive testing is useful, otherwise it is time consuming and not 
feasible for circuits with a large number of inputs [10]. 
 
Figure 8: Complete LFSRs (a) four-stage standard LFSR (b) four stage modular LFSR 
(c) Minimized version of (a) (d) Minimized version of (b) [10] 
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2.7.2 Binary Counter 
Figure 9 shows the example of a binary counter used as the test pattern generator for a 4 input 
combinational logic. The area overhead required by the binary counters is much larger as compared 
to the conventional LFSR used as a test pattern generator [22]. 
2.8 Pseudo Exhaustive Testing  
 This type of testing requires a fewer number of test patterns as opposed to 2n test pattern required 
by the exhaustive test technique for a combinational logic with “n” inputs. All the stuck at faults 
can be covered by this method of testing. 
2.9 Pseudo Random Testing  
In this type of testing, a pseudo-random test pattern generator is used (PRPG) for generating the 
pseudo random test sequences [9, 10, 15]. This type of testing can be used for combinational as 
well as sequential circuits but does not give a clear idea of the fault coverage and the length of test 
sequence to be used for testing. However, many schemes have been proposed to resolve this 
shortcoming in [23, 24]. 
2.9.1 Maximum-Length LFSR 
Maximal Length LFSR can be used as the pseudo random test pattern generator. The sequences 
produced by a maximal length LFSR has 0.5 probability of generating 1’s and 0.5 probability of 
 
Figure 9: Binary counter used as Exhaustive Pattern Generation [10] 
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generating 0’s at the output. The shortcoming of using this technique is that the circuit under test 
may be resistant to the random pattern which means that the probability of certain nodes receiving 
the 0 or 1 value is low assuming the probability of having 0 or 1 in the input sequence is equal 
[25]. 
2.9.2 Weighted LFSR  
To solve the problem of pattern resistant faults and increase the fault coverage in RP-resistant 
circuits, this method of testing is used. It uses an LFSR and a combinational circuit known as the 
weighted pattern generation technique which is described in [26]. The motivation to fit the 
combinational circuit between the output of the combinational circuit and the LFSR is to increase 
the frequency of some patterns and decrease the frequency of certain test patterns; hence, this 
technique increases the probability of detecting those faults which cannot be detected by using 
simple LFSR as the test pattern generation. The method to implement this technique is discussed 
in [27].This technique changes the equal distribution of maximal length LFSR so as to produce the 
equal distribution weighted input sequence containing 0s and 1s which are fed to the combinational 
logic under test. It adjusts the probability distribution to 0.25 or 0.75 instead of 0.5which helps in 
increasing the fault coverage not covered by the 0.5 distribution model. In [28-30], good fault 
coverage was obtained by assuming a probability distribution fault model. 
2.10 Segmentation Testing 
In the circuits where the length of the test pattern is too large or the number of inputs n is too large, 
a segmentation technique or partitioning technique is followed to reduce the test time [31]. By 
dividing the circuit under test into segments or partitions, this technique uses the idea of exhaustive 
testing. The partitioning can be achieved in one of two ways:  hardware partitioning or sensitized 
partitioning [31-32]. In hardware partitioning, multiplexers are inserted and the embedded inputs 
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and outputs of the sub circuits are connected to unused primary inputs and outputs of the sub circuit 
under test. In sensitized partitioning, the circuit partitioning and the sub circuit isolation are 
achieved by applying the input test patterns to the input lines. The process of partitioning the circuit 
and testing it simplifies the overall testing process. Although the multiplexers reduce the operating 
speed, the overall functionality is not altered and hence, this method is still used as an accepted 
technique [33-35].  
2.10.1 Signature Analysis  
Signature analysis is one of the most widely used compaction techniques which is based upon the 
idea of cyclic redundancy checking (CRC) [16]. This technique can be divided into two categories: 
(1) serial signature analysis, which is used for compacting the output responses obtained from 
the circuit under test having a single output and (2) parallel signature analysis, which is used for 
compacting the responses obtained from the logic under test having multiple outputs [36-39]. 
1. Serial Signature Analysis Technique 
In this type of technique, LFSR is used for the signature analysis and XOR gates are used for 
compacting the L-bit output sequence obtained from the logic under test. Figure 10 shows an “L” 




Figure 10: N-stage single input shift register [10] 
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Let the L-bit message be defined as M= {m0m1m2…..mL-1} and can be written as 
 
                                     𝑀(𝑥) = 𝑚0 + 𝑚1𝑥 + 𝑚2𝑥
2 + ⋯ + 𝑚𝐿−1𝑥
𝐿−1 
 
As the L-bit sequence is shifted into the modular LFSR, the remainder of the serial shift register 
R is given by {r0r1r2…..rn-1xn-1} expressed below as 
 
𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑟0 + 𝑟1𝑥 + 𝑟2𝑥
2 + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑛−1𝑥
𝑛−1 
 
The above response analyzer works as the CRC code generator [39]. Assuming that the LFSR is 
defined by the characteristic polynomial f(x) then the polynomial division can be defined as  
𝑀(𝑥) = 𝑞(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑟(𝑥) 
 
The final signature obtained from the SISR is the remainder r(x) of the polynomial division. 
2. Parallel Signature Analysis Technique 
Other response analysis techniques such as transition count testing, ones counting, and the serial 
signature technique require a significant area overhead for testing an output with n-bit 
combinational logic. Figure 11 shows the n stage multiple input signature registers. In the multiple 
 
Figure 11: N stage multiple input shift register [10] 
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input signature analysis technique, n-XOR gates are used in combination with the modular LFSR 
so as to compact the n L-bit output sequences from M0 to Mn-1. In [40-42], it is shown that the 
MISR with n-inputs can be modeled as the n-input SISR if the input sequence is M(x) and the error 
polynomial is E(x) as written below [41]. 




















                                     Boundary Scan and Core Based Testing 
3.1 Introduction  
The standard for the Boundary scan based testing is IEEE 1149.1 standard, also known as the 
JTAG standard. The standard was developed for testing of digital circuits on the board level and 
the standard is also used for testing integrated circuits. The standard has also an extension by the 
name of IEEE 1149.6 standard and is used for the prototyping of input/output high speed networks 
[44]. 
          To address the problems related to testing the core based ICs where the intellectual 
properties (IPs) act as the building blocks, a different standard is developed which is analogous to 
the IEEE 1149.1 standard. The standard for core based testing is known as P1500 standard 
approved by IEEE in 2005.Most of the features in this standard are similar to that of the IEEE 
1149.1 standard. Various features are supported by this core based testing standard such as design 
reusability, plug and play features, and hierarchical test features [10].  
           In this chapter, both standards are discussed in detail and a comparison is also made between 
the two widely known industry standards. The attacker can take the advantage of the full 
controllability and observability provided by these standards and attack the device under test while 




3.2 IEEE 1149.1 Boundary Scan Standard 
 
As shown in figure 12, the boards are connected serially as defined by IEEE 1149.1 standard to 
support boundary scan based testing at the board level. The motivation to call it boundary scan 
structure comes from the fact that the circuit under test is surrounded by the boundary scan cells 
serially so as to have good controllability and observability for the circuit under test. Those chips 
which support the IEEE 1149.1 architecture can be fitted in the board level architecture through 
the boundary scan registers. This protocol also supports the normal chip operations and thus, 
enhances the design debugging and testing capabilities [9]. The standard also supports the 
interconnect testing between the different circuits under test connected in a daisy chain architecture 
[45]. 
 
Figure 12: Board level testing in daisy chain architecture [10] 
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3.3 IEEE 1149.1 Test Architecture and Working    
Extra circuitry and memory is included in the IEEE 1149.1 architecture in addition to the boundary 
scan cells so as to support the working of the whole IEEE standard. The internal logic, as shown 
in the figure 13, is the actual circuit under test which is compliant for various designs for test 
techniques such as scan based tests, built in self-test (BIST), and the boundary scan test technique. 
The standard is known to consist of various modules such as  
 a test Access port (TAP)  which is made of 5 terminals called test data input (TDI), test 
data output (TDO), test mode select (TMS), test clock (TCK), and test reset (TRST); 
 a TAP controller (TAPC); 
 an associated decoder and instruction register (IR);  
 many registers such as bypass registers, boundary scan registers, device ID registers and 
specific data registers which are used to control the signal flow; and  
 the TAP controller, which is a 16-bit state machines that controls the working of the state 
machines [9-10]. 
In addition to the test access port which is defined above, the IEEE 1149.1 architecture also 
consists of a 16-bit finite state machine which controls each step of the boundary scan architecture. 
The instruction which needs to be executed is serially loaded onto the instruction register through 
the external available TDI pin to the external user. The test signals which configure the boundary 




Figure 13 shows the detailed structure of the serially connected board as shown in figure 12 above. 
The TAP port defines the standard for the boundary scan as well as additional input/output pins. 
The instructions in the boundary scan architecture are loaded through the test data input (TDI) 
pin.  The associated decoder controls the test instructions so as to perform boundary related scan 
based tests. Additionally, there are test data registers which load the system-specific related 
information (namely company name, device ID instruction). Some of the mandatory test 
instructions such as SAMPLE, BYPASS, PRELOAD and EXTEST and several other instruction 
sets such as RUNBIST, CLAMP, USERCODE, IDCODE, HIGHZ are also included in this 
standard [45]. 
 
Figure 13: IEEE 1149.1 architecture [45] 
26 
 
3.4   Boundary Scan Cell, Test Circuitry and Bus protocols  
 
Figure 14 shows the detailed boundary scan cell which forms part of the long boundary scan chain. 
The cell can be configured to acts as an input or output cell. For BSC as an input cell, the IN signal 
is used for the chip input pad whereas for BSC as an output cell, the OUT signal is connected to 
the output signal pad. The Mode signal controls the data driven on the OUT signal line. When 
Mode signal is disabled the boundary scan cell is in the normal mode of operation, data passes 
from IN to OUT directly like a short signal. Conversely, when Mode signal is enabled the boundary 
scan cell is in  test mode of operation,  data stored in the R2 flip flop is shifted from the multiplexer 
through the OUT signal port. The operations which a boundary scan cell can support are clockDR, 
shiftDR and updateDR. When the shiftDR signal is disabled and clockDR signal is enabled, the 
data which is present at IN is captured by the capture flip flop. Similarly, when the shiftDR is 
enabled and the clock pulse is applied to clockDR, the data is shifted from scan input SI to scan 
output SO to feed into the next boundary scan cell [45]. 
 
 
Figure 14: A Boundary Scan Cell [45] 
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3.4.1 TAP State diagram  
 
Figure 15 shows all the state transition of the TAP controller in accordance with the state diagram. 
The states are controlled by the rising edge of the TCLK; on the other hand, the next state is being 
determined by the logic level of TMS. There are nine control signals being solely controlled by 
the TAP controller, namely, clockDR, shiftDR, updateDR, clockIR, shiftIR, updateIR, selectTCK, 
and enable signals. All 16-states are divided into three categories. The leftmost states consist of 
two states, namely, rest and the “Run-Test Idle” state. This is followed by the middle part which 
has 7 states and lastly, the rightmost part which also has 7 states. The functions of the rightmost 
part are analogous to middle part; however, there is a difference between the set of registers being 
used to perform these operations [45]. 
 
 




The important states can be described as follows [45-47]: 
 Test-Logic-rest: The boundary scan circuitry is disabled so that the system can perform in 
the normal mode of operation. If the Logic 0 is applied to the TRST port, then the TAPC 
enters this state. The TAPC can be synchronously reset to logic 1 if the TMS is applied for 
5 clock cycles. If a glitch occurs at the TMS, then the TAP controller is forced into the 
Run/test idle state. In order to return to the normal state, the TAP controller has to be kept 
at 1 for the next 3 clock cycles. 
 Run-Test Idle:  In this state, the boundary scan circuitry waits for some test operations to 
be synchronized with the TCK. 
 Select DR Scan- This is one of the temporary states aimed at initializing the data register 
to enter into the manipulation column. 
 Capture-DR: In this state, the data is loaded in parallel to the specified data registers. This 
state is used to capture the current test results and the normal operation status. 
 Shift-DR: The stored test data is scanned out from the data registers by the current 
instruction. As long as the TMS is 0, the TAP controller will remain in this state.  
 Exit-DR: In this state, all parallel loaded or shifted data held in the data registers are 
preparing for the update or pause instruction. 
 Pause-DR: This is used to pause the normal operation so as to perform some external 
operation. This command is useful if the test operation is to be paused so that the tester can 




 EXIT2-DR: This instruction is used to indicate the completion of the test procedure. In 
addition, it allows the TAPC to enter into the update state or to indicate the end of the 
Pause-DR command such that the Shift-DR can be activated so as to shift more data. 
 Update-DR: In this command, the data is latched so as to obtain the parallel output from 
the selected data registers on the falling edge of the TCLK. The data stored in one data 
register is shifted to another data register in the boundary scan cell discussed above so as 
to perform the operation of a serial shift register.  
3.5 IEEE 1500 Architecture  
 
The IEEE 1500 standard defines the use of wrapper architecture on the boundary of input/output 
terminals of different cores which allows the testing of different types of cores in a standardized 
manner. Figure 16 shows the scenario where the N cores are wrapped by the IEEE 1500 standard 
defined wrapper. The wrapper serial port (WSP) comprises of the wrapper serial instructions which  
 
Figure 16: IEEE P1500 illustrating wrapper on different cores and TAM [48] 
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consist of wrapper serial input (WSI), the wrapper serial output (WSO), and several wrapper 
serial control (WSC) terminals. The individual wrapper has an instruction register called the 
wrapper instruction register (WIR) whose function is to store the instruction to be executed for 
the individual cores [48-50]. The wrapper serial port supports serial test instructions much like the 
boundary test architecture of the IEEE 1149.1 architecture. Moreover, the IEEE 1500 standard also 
supports parallel test access mechanisms. Individual cores can have their own TAM-in and TAM-
out ports consisting of different control lines to support the parallel test access instructions for the 
cores.  Figure 17 shows the both the core interface and the serial and parallel data control as being 
highlighted. Also reflected in figure 17 are the wrapper parallel control (WPC), wrapper port 
input (WPI), maps to the TAM input port and the wrapper parallel output (WPO) which 
corresponds to the wrapper output port. In the IEEE 1500 standard, serial ports are defined to be 
mandatory; on the other hand, the parallel ports are defined to be optional. The parallel interface 
defined in the IEEE 1500 standard leads to significant test time reductions for the SoC based testing 
 
Figure 17: IEEE P1500 Test interface illustrating parallel and serial wrappers [48] 
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as compared to the IEEE 1149.1 standard. In the IEEE 1500 standard, the use of core test language 
is also proposed which supports the usage of different kinds of cores from different vendors on the 
same system on chip. The language defined can capture and express the test related information 
by complying with the defined IEEE 1500 standard [48]. 
Figure 18 shows the detailed architecture of the IEEE 1500 standard and the standard core 
architecture which compromises of the following parts, as described below [48]: 
1.   Wrapper serial port (WSP) which consists of wrapper serial input (WSI), wrapper serial 
output port (WSO), and several wrapper terminals. Analogous to TDI and TDO of the 
IEEE 1149.1 standard, WSP uses WSI and WSO to scan in and out the wrapper instructions 
in the IEEE 1500 standard. The mandatory instructions which are included are WRSTN, 
 
Figure 18: Test circuitry supporting IEEE P1500 architecture [48] 
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WRCK, SelectWIR, CaptureWR, ShiftWR, and UpdateWR with optional instructions 
called TransferDR which are briefly defined below.  
 WRCK- This instruction is dedicated to the operation of the IEEE 1500 standard. 
 AUXCKn- This instruction is used for the auxiliary 1500 clocks and can be used 
for the implementation of wrapper boundary registers. The n signifies the number 
of auxiliary clocks which signifies the number of clock being used. These clocks 
can be shared by the system clocks as well. 
 WRSTN-This instruction resets the wrapper circuitry and takes the system into the 
normal mode of operation, as required. The wrapper bypass instruction is analogous 
to the wrapper instruction defined in the IEEE 1149.1 standard. 
 SelectWIR- This instruction is used to determine an instruction or the data type of 
operation to be performed. If the selectWIR =1, then it signifies the connection 
between WSI and WSO, else only some data registers are connected between WSI 
and WSO.  
 CaptureWR-This instruction is used to enable capture operation for the selected 
data registers. 
 ShiftWR- This instruction enables the shift operation for the selected registers. 
 UpdateWR- As the name suggests, it is used for the update operation of the data 
registers. 
 TransferDR-This is used for the transfer operation for of the selected registers 
implementing the transfer function. 
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2. Wrapper Parallel Port (WPP) comprises of the user defined wrapper parallel input (WPI), 
wrapper parallel output (WPO), and wrapper parallel control (WPC) signals. All of these 
terminals are optional and a WPP may include clock terminals of the WSC. 
3. Wrapper Instruction Register (WIR) is used to store the information which needs to be 
executed in the IEEE 1149.1 standard. When the WSC is set to 1, the WIR is selected 
unconditionally. It is implemented using a two stage design which supports the loading and 
shifting of the instruction in the data registers. The broad differences between the IEEE 
1149.1 and IEEE 1500 standard can be outlined as follows: 
 There is no state machine used in the IEEE 1500 standard and the control signals 
used are provided by the WIR, which get the instruction form the WSC terminals. 
Figure 28 shows the image of the wrapper instruction register which consists of 
shift stage and decode/update stage as well; and 
 IEEE 1500 optionally provides a parallel load mode as shown in figure 24, which 
allows the WIR to capture the control information directly or to capture data that 
can be used to test WIR or other IEEE 1500 circuitry. 
4. Wrapper Bypass Register (WBY) - is used similarly to the bypass register used in the IEEE 
1149.1 architecture. The WBY register is selected and connected between the WSI and 
WSO if the current instruction of the wrapper bypass register is being executed. It can also 
act as the default register between the WSI and WSO.   
5. Wrapper Boundary Register (WBR) - It consists of wrapper boundary cells analogous to 
the boundary scan registers of the IEEE 1149.1 standard. There are 4 terminals in each 
Wrapper boundary register (WBR),  namely, cell functional input (CFI), cell functional 
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output (CFO), cell test input (CTI), and cell test output (CTO) which is shown in figure 
18.The functional modes are further classified as follows : 
 Normal Mode: The WBR is transparent to the system and core executes the normal 
function of operation. 
 Inward Facing Mode: The test access is for the core and the functional inputs of 
the core are controlled by WBR and also observed by the WBR.  
 Outward Facing Mode: The test access is used for the external test circuitry where 
the wrapper functional outputs and wrapper functional inputs are controlled and 
captured by the Wrapper boundary register (WBR). 
 Nonhazardous (safe) mode- The functional inputs and outputs of the core are 












A Hardware Security Solution against Scan-based Attacks utilizing LFSR 
4.1 Introduction to Hardware attacks  
In this chapter, the possible hardware attacks on the IEEE 1149.1 standard and a secure method of 
testing resilient to hardware attacks are presented and discussed. Scan based designs for test 
techniques have been widely adopted and used for many years. Though such access is desirable 
for testing the circuit under test, it is not acceptable for secure chips as it can lead to their 
exploitation. In the proposed method, a secure way of testing the circuit under test is presented and 
the access to the circuit under test is severely limited so as to reduce the risk of scan based attacks. 
To address the testability issue, a built in self-test is proposed so as to thwart off against scan based 
and side channel analysis attacks. 
4.2 Literature Survey and Existing solutions in Literature 
Scan based testing provides a good control over the controllability and observability of the circuit 
under test. Such access is not desired for the secure circuit under test. Scan chain based testing can 
also be exploited for cryptanalysis attacks as they give direct access to the circuit under test [51-
52]. Also, various other attacks such as differential power analysis attacks [52], timing analysis 
attacks [53], and fault injection attacks [54-55] may present themselves when using scan chain 
based testing. Many well-known encryption algorithms such as the RC4 stream cipher and the 
AES encryption algorithm have been attacked by the use of scan based testing techniques [56]. 
Thus, a tradeoff needs to be maintained between the security and testability of the chip under test. 
In [57], authors have discussed how the scan chains can be used to retrieve the secret key from the 
chip under test even when the critical registers containing the secret key are not included in the 
chip. In [58], authors have used scan based design for the test method from the perspective of 
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physically unclonable functions (PUF).The variations present in terms of process, voltage and 
temperature in addition to the intrinsic characteristics of PUFs have all been studied and discussed 
by the authors. Yu Zheng et.al. [59-60], have discussed how scan chains can be used from the 
perspective of PUF and how unique signatures can be obtained from scan chains. To counter scan 
based attacks various solutions have been proposed such as using built-in-self-test for testing, 
hybrid designs which are combination of BIST and scan chains [61]. Yang et.al. [57, 62] have 
discussed attacks against the Advanced Encryption Standard hardware implementation by using 
scan chains as the tool for information leakage and for the recovery of the crypto key of the 
Advanced Encryption Standard. To mitigate the problem of scan based attacks, authors have also 
introduced a solution which uses the mirror key registers for the insecure mode of testing and a 
different set of registers for the secure mode of testing. Authors have also concluded that even if 
the key register are not directly scannable, the attackers can still build the key and hence, attack 
the system. In [63], authors have proposed a scan chain scrambling technique which, provided that 
the right key is given, the assignment of key registers is static, else the semi-random values are 
assigned to the key registers. Lock and key technique is proposed in [64] to mitigate the problem 
of scan based attacks. Here, they have used a linear feedback shift register so as to input the right 
test vectors in the circuit under test. A right test key is needed to switch from the insecure mode to 
the secure mode of testing. If the test key entered by the user is not authentic, the LFSR assumes 
the semi random values which can mislead the attacker. Low cost secure scan (LCCS) has been 
proposed as a solution for the protection of intellectual property information in [65]. In this 
solution, dummy flip flops are used in addition to the normal D flip flops in the scan based testing 
technique. At the time of testing, the right test key needs to be entered in the right sequence with 
the dummy D flip flops. If the right test key is not integrated in accordance with the position of the 
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dummy flip flops, then random values are assigned in the scan based testing technique and random 
responses are shifted out from the flip flops. In [66], authors have proposed a scan based 
architecture in which the subsequent values are changed dynamically at each stage of scan flip 
flops and hence, creates a secure way of testing the circuit under test.  
4.3 Scan Based Attacks 
Scan chains provide full access to the circuit under test (CUT) through the test access port of the 
CUT in the test phase. The test responses obtained from the circuit under test are used for the 
evaluation. The scan based testing operation can be described in the following four steps. 
a) Scan In: In this step, the test vectors are serially loaded into the scan flip flops which are 
directly connected to the circuit under test. The known test values can even be fed to the 
critical registers in the scan based test technique. 
b) Response Capture: The response of the applied test vectors to the circuit under test is 
captured at the output by the scan flip flops. 
c) Scan Out: The response captured by the scan flip flops are shifted out and are available at 
the output pin TDO. 
d) Response Evaluation: The responses obtained for the circuit under test are analyzed by 
the attacker to unfold the test circuitry and hence, decode the position of the critical 
registers. 
To counter this type of scan based attack and make the data obtained from scan based testing less 
prone to attacks, a solution has been proposed in [56] to introduce random invertors in the scan 
chain path. For a total number of m flip flops, the proposed solution can have 2m various possible 
configurations and the probability of attack would then be 1/2m.The shortcoming of this technique 
is that after fabrication, the positon of invertors cannot be changed and it remains fixed forever. A 
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spy flip flop scheme has been proposed in [67] which prevents the switching from one mode to 
another mode of testing. This scheme requires the use of a secure test controller and the overhead 
area of the proposed scheme is also very significant. The architecture discussed above is not prone 
to fault injection or side channel power analysis attacks which are different types of attacks to leak 
out critical information from scan based testing. 
4.4 Proposed Method 
In the proposed method of testing, the secret code is generated by an array of flip flops which can 
be used for the purpose of encryption or identification as shown in figure 19. The flip flops are 
hard wired to generate the secret key at the power-on state of the array of flip flops. To protect the 
secret key created by the array of flip fops against scan based attacks, direct access to the flip flops 
is not given in the proposed technique. Instead, a built in self-test is used as the design for test 
method to test the circuit under test. There are two modes of operation in the proposed method: (a) 
the secure mode or the safe mode of operation and (b) the test mode or the insecure mode of testing. 
In the test mode of operation of scan based testing, the first three flip flops are configured to work 
as the test pattern generator (TPG) which generates the code for the testing of the circuit under test 
and is shifted through the array of flip flops. The proposed scheme does not allow switching from 




insecure mode, then the following steps are sequentially taken [68]:  
 a reset signal is applied to the array of flip flops containing the secret key to clear the 
content of all flip flops; 
 the first three flip flops are converted to a 3 bit-LFSR to act as an Automatic Test pattern 
generator (ATPG) for the array of flip flops configured as the shift register in this mode of 
testing;  
 the access to the output of the shift register is granted to the scan chain which will allow 
the scan chain to capture the data and perform the response evaluation operation; and lastly 
 the data captured by the scan chain is compared against the response of a fault free circuit 
to determine whether or not the circuit generating the secret key is faulty.. 
 
 




It is not necessary to power off the circuit while switching from the secure mode to the test mode 
as the reset signal is applied to the array of flip flops. The proposed architecture in the secure mode 
of testing is shown in the figure 20. The test patterns which are generated by the test pattern 
generator are shown in the figure 21 and are determined by the number of D flip flops required for 
the purpose of testing. As compared to the test techniques proposed in [65], no separate set of 
registers is needed for the different modes of testing and it reduces the area overhead by a large 
amount. A fault in the circuit generating the secret code changes the output data captured by the 
scan chain. The transition from the secure mode to insecure mode sends a reset signal through the 
chain of flip flops as shown in the figure 22.The control circuit prevents the attackers from access 
to the key through the shifting of the data right after changing the mode of operation. To address 
the testability issue of the key generating circuit a built in self-test (BIST) is developed in the figure 
19 [68]. 
 




The first three flip flops are configured to form the shift register which generates the test patterns 
represented by the equation [68] 
                                              𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑆𝑅 = 𝑥
3 + 𝑥 + 1 
The pattern generated by the LFSR is applied to the rest of the flip flops and the response by the 
last flip flop is captured by the scan chain for the evaluation. The test patterns generated by the 
LFSR is shown in the figure 21. It can cover all the stuck at faults since the output of each flip flop 
has to switch from the high to low and low to high. It can also be used cover the delay faults due 
to the successive number of transitions between the adjacent test patterns. A fault in the circuit 
generating the secret code changes the output data captured by the scan chain. To support the 
proposed architecture, one state can be added to the IEEE 1149.1 boundary scan architecture as 
shown in figure 23. The states of the TAP controller has to accommodate one extra state to support 
the secure mode of testing.  
 
Figure 21: 3-bit LFSR configured to act as test pattern generator [68] 
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As the Test Mode select (TMS) switches to the high level, it enters the safe mode and remains in 
this mode as long as the TMS is high. In this state, the N bit secret key loads while the access to 
the main scan chain is disabled. As soon as the TMS switches to low, it will change state and enters 
the scan mode. Before switching to the scan mode, the control circuit generates a pulse to reset the 
flip flops [68]. 
 
 
Figure 22: Test Controller for switching between various modes of testing [68] 
 
Figure 23: Modified 16-bit state machine supporting IEEE 1149.1 architecture [68] 
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4.5 Simulation Results 
The proposed architecture in [68] was implemented in the Cadence environment with 65nm 
technology. The results were also compared to the existing solutions in literature and are shown in 
the Table 2. The effect on increasing area overhead has also been studied. The layout of the 
proposed architecture is also shown figure 24. The proposed architecture consumes 1571 µm2 of 
Silicon. The proposed architecture is almost linearly scaled with the use of 256 bit secret key, 




Figure 24: The implemented design on cadence 65nm suite [68] 
 




A Secure Test Solution using BIST for Crypto-Cores  
5.1 Introduction to Core based attacks 
A common system-on-chip (SoC) can have many embedded cores. Generally, the cores embedded 
on the system-on-chip can come from various chip vendors .The cores embedded on the chip can 
be in the form of soft cores or hard cores. Testing of system on chips by itself has become a 
problem the security related concerns add another dimension to the complexity of system on chip 
(SoC) testing. Scan based design for testability is one of the popular test techniques but this method 
compromises the security of the device under test. The system utilizing scan chains are prone to 
various types of attacks.  
5.2 Scan based attacks and countermeasures  
Many encryption algorithms such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES), and Triple DES are key based algorithms and involve either the use of a private 
key or a public key in the encryption and decryption of the plaintext. Attackers can analyze and 
access the key involved in these algorithms and thus, attack the whole system [69]. The AES 
algorithm is a widely accepted standard by NIST [70]. AES can use a 192, 128 or 256 bit input to 
encrypt or decrypt the data. The plaintext data is processed and computed on two dimensional 
arrays. As the first round, also known as the initial round, is completed using the round function, 
the plaintext message is copied to an array.  It is then XOR-ed with a secret key contained in the 





The final state is then copied as the output. The round function of AES can be parameterized by 
the key expansion and it is capable of generating a variation of the original secret key for another 
round. A single AES round consists of many operations such as SubBytes, ShiftRows, 
MixColumns, and the AddRoundkey operations. Once the first round is completed, the computed 
value of the round register is used in the second round. For testing the functionality of a chip, it is 
mandatory to include the round register. The attacker takes advantage of the chip using the scan 
chain embedded in the chip to retrieve the secret key used in the encryption algorithms. Figure 25 
illustrates the steps involved in AES encryption operation, and figure 26 shows how an attacker 
can attack the round operation of AES using the internal scan chains. The round register also stores 
the intermediate cipher-text before and after the pre-round operation. The attacker switches the 
chip implementing the AES algorithm many times between the normal mode and the test mode to 
build the entire structure of the cryptosystem and control the system as required 
 




by an attacker [71]. An attacker may also resort to a side channel attack [69] or a signature attack 
[72] to obtain the secret key from the encryption algorithms. In [73], a fake key method is 
presented. In the system on chip environment, even though various protection measures are used, 
the critical information can still be obtained through the primary input or output pin. The scan 
based attacks can compromise the security of TV satellite boxes as well, which can lead to the 
shipping of many defective systems to customers. In [74-75], it is shown that the security of the 
crypto system can be compromised if the required steps are not taken to increase the level of system 
security. In [76], the authors have successfully attacked the trivium cipher and have generalized 
the attack to various other stream ciphers as well. Different attacks have been proposed against 
various stream ciphers using scan chain designs [74]. The authors implemented the trivium cipher 
scan chain design on the Spartan FPGA board and proposed the XOR- chain architecture as the 
countermeasure to prevent scan based attacks. In the proposed XOR scan chain 
 
Figure 26: Scan based attack on AES round operation [72] 
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architecture, random XOR gates are inserted in the normal scan chain. In the modified architecture, 
one of the inputs of the XOR gate is the input of the flip flops preceding the normal output of the 
scan chain as shown in figure 27. In the proposed scheme, the XOR gates serve as the invertor and 
invert the previous value of data fed in the scan chain. In Figure 27, the authors have discussed the 
placement of XOR gates at specific positions between the normal D flip flops and discuss the effect 
on the final output pattern obtained from the scan_out pin. In the end, the security and area 
overhead analyses of the proposed technique are also performed with respect to the previous 
published works in literature. By taking advantage of side channel information obtained from the 
scan based attack, many recent encryption algorithms such as RSA [77], ECC [78] can be attacked 
successfully using the scan chains. The proposed secure testability method does not deviate much 
from the normal scan based testing and does not compromise the fault coverage provided by the 
normal scan based test technique. 
 




5.3 Proposed Method 
 
In the proposed method, the access to the crypto-core containing security sensitive information is 
not provided through the scan chain in the operation mode as shown in Figure 28. A BIST is 
considered to perform tests on the crypto-core.  As a result, the boundary scan cannot be used to 
access the critical information in the crypto-core. The BIST controller for the proposed method 
consists of test pattern generators, the circuit under test, and the response analyzers. The BIST 
controller test pattern generator is designed in such a manner that it achieves the required fault 
coverage. The test pattern generated by BIST is fed into the circuit under test and the responses 
obtained from the circuit under test are then compared by the output response analyzer, which 
compares the output with the stored “golden” test patterns. The obtained test responses determines 
whether the circuit under test is faulty or fault free. To shift the responses to the test access port, 
the switches needs to be closed. The proposed method only makes use of the offline BIST i.e. 
when the circuit under test is not in its normal mode of operation. The proposed BIST for testing 
the circuit under test generates the timing control signals and the scan enable signals. All clocks 
are generated by the proposed logic BIST controller to coordinate the BIST operation among the 
TPG, CUT, and ORA, as well. As the test operation is completed, the BIST then sends the final 
 
Figure 28: Proposed Architecture showing the signature analysis 
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done command to indicate the process is complete. The advantage of the proposed solution is 
summarized below. 
 The proposed BIST method can effectively test and find the errors of the system. It can 
also provide the diagnostic information about the circuit under test without the need of an 
external tester. 
 The proposed BIST supports the on-chip implementation and testing of the circuit under 
test which can support at-speed testing for the circuit under test. 
 Using the proposed BIST effectively reduces the dependency on external testers, the test 
time, and test costs as BIST itself acts as the tester for the circuit under test.  
While designing the proposed BIST, much care was taken to deal with the unknown blocking 
values used in the output response analyzer for signature analysis. Any unknown values (X), if fed 
to the output response analyzer, can corrupt the response analyzer and thus, the whole BIST can 
malfunction. In the fault injection attack, the attacker deliberately alters the correct functioning of 
the circuit under test by resorting to different methods such as analyzing the variations in the power 
traces, inducing faulty clocks in the circuit, overheating the device, and sometimes exposing the 
device to particular types of radiation. In one of the methods, an attacker lowers the chip power 
supply level and then injects transient faults by starting from a single bit error and increasing the 
number of faulty bits later. The above methodology is proven to be successful in the ARM 9 
processors [79-80] and in the ASIC implementation of the stream ciphers [81-82].  
5.4 Complexity Analysis  




1. The attacker first needs to find the circuit under test as the different circuits under test may 
have their own specific built in self-test on the system on chip (SoC); 
2. The attacker is aware of the P1500 standard and has the full control of the system on chip;  
3. The attacker has control over the internal scan chain of the circuit under test on the system 
on chip and the pin to the internal scan chain of the circuit under test is not fused out; and 
4. The attacker understands and comes to the fact that the proposed test technique can only 
















A Hardware Secure Solution for Scan enabled Circuits using access Control 
6.1 Introduction 
As human society is progressing towards technological advancement and relying more and more 
on electronic devices, there has been an ever-increasing demand to constantly improve the 
technology available. Since integrated circuits form the heart of electronic devices, there has always 
been demand to have tiny ICs with millions of transistors embedded on them. Testing forms an 
important step which needs to occur before an IC can be released in the market for public use or 
before it can be used for board level applications [83-84]. Over past years, many techniques have 
been developed to test integrated circuit systems at various levels such as the board level or the 
system level.  
6.2 Literature Survey and Existing Solutions 
To test a circuit, an access mechanism has to be developed to control the internal nodes and observe 
their response to applied test vectors. Scan is a widely used technique which increases the 
testability of the device under test. An unrestricted access provided by the scan architecture raises 
a conflict between the security and testability of devices. Though scan based testing offers many 
advantages in controlling and observing the internal nodes of the circuit under test, it also suffers 
from disadvantages as listed below: 
 conventional scan can be used to extract sensitive information such as private key from 
embedded crypto-cores; 




 the volume of the test patterns increases considerably as the design becomes more and 
more complex and hence, the test patterns have to be compressed before they can be applied 
to the circuit under test; and lastly 
 in order to reduce complexity, test time and power consumption, partial scan design can be 
used at the cost of low fault coverage.  
To have a secure test solution against scan based attacks, many methods have been proposed. In 
[85], authors have proposed a new secure solution to protect the secret data from scan based 
attacks. The authors in the proposed architecture have recommended a dedicated architecture to 
control the data fed to the Logic under Test (LUT). The dedicated architecture consists of security 
blocks called reset controllers and scan enable integrity controllers to control a state machine. The 
state machine satisfies two main principles i.e. robust encoding and redundancy. To prevent a 
physical attack on the scan chain, the proposed method also embeds the scan enable integrity block. 
To bypass this block, an attacker has to know the correct position of critical scan flip flops which 
is not an easy task. In [86], Ross et.al. have proposed different attacks against smart cards, TV 
systems, and security processors. It is shown how tamper resistant attacks can easily demean 
security systems. From a variety of available tamper resistant techniques, the designers settled with 
the four layer wrapping of 40 gauge (80 µm) nichrome wire which surrounded the processor, 
battery, memory, and even the sensory circuitry. The authors in [87] have proposed a secure design 
flow for securing ICs against the scan based side channel analysis attacks. To have a secure design, 
rather than using the full custom layout with the iterative design process, the authors have proposed 
a few modifications on the logic synthesis, the place and route step, and the stream out step to have 
a secure design flow. In [88], a secure design for test has been developed for the pipelined 
Advanced Encryption standard. The proposed method provides a good tradeoff between security 
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and testing of crypto ICs, it provides a high test quality, and good fault diagnosis while protecting 
the key of the implemented crypto hardware. In [89-90], various secure scan based designs for test 
are discussed and a secure design for a test technique is proposed by using a popular hash function 
called CRC-MAC (cyclic redundancy check-message authentication algorithm) which performs a 
stream oriented operation on the input stream data. The authors have implemented the CRC-MAC 
algorithm to have a secure design for a test solution. In [91], Chang et.al. have discussed the 
watermarking of ICs as a countermeasure against IP fraudulence by unauthorized foundries. A 
secure solution is proposed in the above paper which protects against the counterfeiting of ICs by 
foundries, the above watermarking scheme bridges the gap between IP protection and IP 
management. The increased area overhead by the proposed method has also been reduced by the 
nearest neighbor algorithm. The authors in [92] have proposed scan based side channel attacks 
against the symmetric stream ciphers, in which the attacker have inserted the scan chains in the 
Light Encryption Device (LED) stream cipher. The 64-bit key was recovered by just applying 73 
different plaintext vectors.  
6.3 Proposed Method 
 
 




In the proposed method a secure controller is used to control the transitions from an insecure mode 
to a secure mode. The controller consists of a hardwired key comparator as shown in figure 29. To 
protect the internal circuit under test against attacks using the scan chain, direct access to the circuit 
under test is not provided in the insecure mode of testing. There are two modes of operation, one 
being the vulnerable or insecure mode in which the key is not provided. The scan chain in this 
mode shifts random data from randomly seeded LFSR as shown in figure 29. The input test vector 
from TDI is XOR-ed with the pattern from the LFSR and consequently, the input test vector at 
TDI needs to be modified accordingly based on the pattern generated by the LFSR. In the proposed 
method a different LFSR has been used if the user is not verified, the purpose of using the different 
LFSR is that attacker is not able to build LFSR from known patterns by Berlekamp Massey 
algorithm. When the device is switched from the vulnerable mode to the secure mode, the 
following operations which take place are summarized below.  
a) A reset signal is applied to the LFSR to erase the contents of the flip flop. 
b) The test key is compared with the hardwired key embedded in the controller at the time of 
manufacturing. 
c) Once the test-key is verified, the scan chain is granted access to the circuit under test. The 
test patterns are XOR-ed with the output of LFSR and then applied to the circuit under test. 
d) After the verification of the key, the user is asked to seed the LFSR; if the seeding of the 
LFSR is wrong, it produces the wrong test patterns 
If the test key is not right, the randomly seeded LFSR delivers random patterns to mislead the 
attackers. The reset signal applied before switching to the secure mode from the vulnerable 
mode ensures that any previous patterns from the LFSR obtained are cleared. 
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6.4 Measurement Results 
 
The above proposed method was implemented on the Altera FPGA DE2 115 board as shown in 
figure 30. The system illustrates the area of the proposed method on the chip planner of the Altera 
Board and the measurement set-up. The hardwired key was implemented using switches on the 
FPGA board and the user key was provided through the input port. When the input key was right 
as compared to the hardwired key, a signal was generated which allowed the circuit to enter the 
secure mode of operation. In the secure mode, the input test patterns were XOR-ed with the LFSR 
data and then applied to the CUT. This is needed to reduce the probability of reverse engineering 
through input and output data analysis. As the input test pattern was applied, the coded output was 
seen at the output as shown in figure 31. However, as shown in figure 33, when the user is not 
verified, access to the main scan chain and the circuit-under test is disabled and the semi-random 
data from the randomly seeded LFSR is shifted out through the TDO pin. However, the variation 
is observed when the length of the implemented LFSR is increased for the purpose of high security.  
 




The proposed solution is compared with the existing solutions in literature in Table 3. To switch 
from the insecure mode to the secure mode and vice versa, a controller is proposed which is shown 
in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 31: Waveform if user is granted access to scan chain 
 
























The proposed solution in this section reduces the area overhead as compared to the existing 
solutions as shown in table 3. The proposed solution checks the authenticity of tester at two levels. 
 
Figure 33: Waveform to support if the user is not granted access 
 




                                     Summary, Conclusions and Future Work 
Scan based design as a test method is an effective technique that provides strong controllability 
and observability which, in turn, provides a high fault coverage for the circuit under test. Using 
scan chains for testing opens the opportunity for a scan-based attack. In this thesis, three solutions 
for different applications have been proposed to protect a circuit-under-test against scan-based 
attacks.   
A fully testable circuit may not be secure as it grants the full controllability and observability of 
the circuit nodes to the tester. To address the trade-off between security and testability, an LFSR 
based solution was proposed. The proposed solution operates in two modes (a) the secure mode of 
testing and (b) the test mode or the insecure mode of testing. In the secure mode, the circuit under 
test is isolated from the scan chain and even an indirect access is not provided to the circuit under 
test. An embedded LFSR was used to generate the test patterns for the circuit under test. Denying 
access to enter any input pattern in the secure mode of testing wards off the opportunity to mount 
any successful attacks on the circuit under test. In the insecure mode of testing, access to the circuit 
under test is given but the access to the key is disabled in this mode of testing.   
In the second method, a built-in self-test solution for the cores embedded in a system on chip (SoC) 
has been proposed. The proposed solution does not need an advanced external tester to perform 
the tests on the system-on-chip.  If the circuit is tested at the manufacturing stage, full access to 
the device-under-test is granted. On the contrary, if the device is tested in-field, access to the CUT 
is disabled.  
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In the third method, a secure control test solution is presented. In this method, a test key is used to 
grant access to the CUT.  If the test key is verified, then access to the main scan chain is given, 
else random data is shifted out from a random pattern generator to mislead the attacker. 
With the emergence of new technologies, new test solutions have to be developed to ensure 
security and prevent security threats against hardware through the scan architecture. TSV based 
3D stacked ICs are expected to present significant performance improvements compared to the 
conventional 2D ICs. The potential of this new technology will not be fully materialized if the 
security related issues are not properly addressed. A hardware security solution against side-
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